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Abstract: Shareholders and board of directors in an annual general 
meeting (AGM) are the two organs of a company. Shareholders 
are legally empowered to participate in the AGM to meet directors 
and know about the performance of the company. Despite various 
philosophies (theories) and legal provisions on shareholder 
participation in AGMs, shareholders are still facing some 
challenges. Moreover, available literature in this area is limited in 
Nigeria. Therefore, this study seeks to examine various philosophies 
(theories), the law, cases and opinions of experts on shareholder 
participation, practices and the role of shareholder associations in 
protecting the rights of shareholders. The study adopted two methods 
of data collection. The first method was doctrinal legal research 
(library based) which mainly concerned statutory provisions under 
the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 (CAMA) and decisions 
of the court. The second method of data collection consisted of 
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qualitative interviews with seventeen respondents regarding the 
theories, practices and role of shareholder associations in protecting 
the rights of shareholder participation in AGMs. The findings showed 
that shareholder participation can be supported by various theories 
including corporate personality theory; agency theory; contract 
theory; shareholder primacy; and corporate governance. The finding 
equally indicated that shareholders in Nigeria received notices of 
AGMs late, due to postal inefficiency and lack of recognition of 
ICT under the CAMA. Similarly, both regulators and shareholder 
associations have not done enough to protect shareholders and to 
improve their participation in AGMs. In view of this, there is a need 
for proactive measures to improve the participation of shareholders 
in AGMs. This is by amending the CAMA to incorporate provisions 
that will facilitate the effective service of notices of AGMs. Similarly, 
shareholder associations and regulators must take the responsibility 
of enlightening shareholders on their right of participation as well 
as how to enforce their rights in AGMs.
 
Keywords: Shareholders, Annual general meeting, Shareholder 
associations
Abstrak: Saham dan lembaga pengarah merupakan organ penting 
dalam sebuah syarikat. Pemegang saham berhak untuk menyertai 
mesyuarat agung tahunan (dirujuk sebagai AGM) di mana ia 
membolehkan pemegang saham berpeluang bertemu dengan 
lembaga pengarah dan mengambil tahu perkembangan dan prestasi 
syarikat. Meskipun terdapat pelbagai teori dan peruntukan undang-
undang berkenaan penyertaan pemegang saham semasa AGM, 
pemegang saham masih menghadapi pelbagai cabaran dalam aspek 
ini. Di Nigeria, kajian yang telah dijalankan bagi isu ini adalah 
minima. Atas asas ini, kertas kajian ini dimulakan bagi mengkaji 
pelbagai falsafah/teori; peruntukan undang-undang; kes-kes yang 
telah diputuskan; dan padangan pakar berkenaan penyertaan 
pemegang saham. Untuk tujuan itu, kajian ini mengguna pakai 
kaedah doktrinal dan sosio undang-undang untuk mencapai objektif 
kajian. Kaedah pertama iaitu kaedah doktrinal tertumpu kepada 
penelitian terhadap peruntukan undang-undang dibawah CAMA 
1990 dan kes-kes yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah. Kaedah 
kedua yang digunapakai merupakan kaedah sosio undang-undang 
yang meliputi sebanyak tujuh belas sesi temu ramah dalam format 
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semi berstruktur yang berkisar mengenai teori, amalan dan fungsi 
persatuan pemegang saham dalam penyertaan semasa AGM. Hasil 
kajian menunjukkan bahawa penyertaan pemegang saham disokong 
oleh pelbagai falsafah merangkumi personaliti korporat; teori 
agensi; teori kontrak; keutamaan kedudukan pemegang saham;dan 
tadbir urus korporat. Dapatan kajian ini juga memperlihatkan 
bahawa terdapat kelewatan menerima notis AGM oleh pemegang 
saham di Nigeria, berpunca dari perkhidmatan pos yang tidak 
efektif dan kurangnya pengikitirafan pemakaian teknologi di 
bawah CAMA 1990. Penguatkuasa undang-undang dan persatuan 
pemegang saham juga gagal menitikberatkan hak pemegang saham 
serta menambahbaik penyertaan pemegang saham semasa AGM. 
Justeru, terbit keperluan mendesak untuk mengambil langkah-
langkah proaktif bagi menambahbaik penyertaan pemegang saham 
semasa AGM, antara lainnya, dengan meminda CAMA untuk 
memasukkan peruntukan bagi penyerahan notis AGM yang efektif. 
Selain itu, persatuan pemegang saham dan penguatkuasa undang-
undang hendaklah mengambil inisiatif sewajarnya dengan mewar-
warkan dan memberi kesedaran kepada pemegang saham akan 
haknya dalam penyertaan AGM.




Members of a company play a vital role at a general meeting by 
way of direct participation in running the affairs of the company. 
They must be treated fairly, regardless of the percentage of their 
shareholding in the company and generally, are entitled to enjoy 
some basic rights provided under the law. They have the right to 
access relevant information regarding the performance of the 
company. Thus, the relationship that exists between members and 
the company itself is a contractual one which allows the members to 
influence corporate decisions to a certain extent as underlined by the 
company’s articles of association.
Section 63 of the CAMA distributes corporate powers between the 
board of directors and shareholders in the annual general meeting 
(AGM). The board is in charge of the day-to-day activities of the 
company because it is difficult for all the shareholders to participate 
46
UUMJLS 10(1) Jan 2019  (43-67)
in the management of the company.1 Accordingly, the board of 
directors owes a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the 
company.2 The board is also accountable to the shareholders in the 
general meeting.3 In this regard, sections 81, 213, 227(1), and 228 
of the CAMA recognised the right of shareholders to receive notice; 
attend and vote in AGMs. In the English case of Sharp v. Dawes,4 
�meeting’ is defined as a gathering of two or more persons whose 
aim is to discuss issues of mutual interest. In some jurisdictions, a 
single person can hold a valid meeting. Shareholder meeting is an 
assembly of shareholders having the right to attend, and vote in the 
meeting.5 According to section 65 of the CAMA, decisions taken 
in the meeting is regarded as the decisions of the company. In fact, 
the importance of AGMs cannot be overstated. In the case of New 
Resources International Ltd & Anor v. Ejike Oranusi,6 the Court of 
Appeal of Nigeria held that the decision of a company is taken at 
the AGM or the board of director’s meeting through a resolution. 
Therefore, shareholders’ attendance in an AGM is an opportunity 
for shareholders to know the performance of a company through 
the presentation of a statutory report.7 It is also a forum where the 
1 Apostolides, N. (2007). Directors Versus Shareholders: Evaluating Corporate 
Governance in the UK Using the AGM Scorecard. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 15(6), 1277-1287; Kotoye v. Saraki [1994] 7 
NWLR 414 at 467; Galbreath, J. (2017). The Impact of Board Structure on 
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Temporal View. Business Strategy and the 
Environment, 26(3), 358-370.
2 Anandarajah, K. (2001). Corporate Governance. A Practical Approach. Asia: 
Butterworth; Ajoku, O. O. (2014). Demythification of the organic theory of 
company law through the lens of corporate governance jurisprudence: Revisit-
ing shareholder’s activism (Case Study of Nigeria’s Company and Allied Mat-
ters Act, 2004).
3 Brudney, V. (1996). Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law. BCL 
Rev. 38, 595.
4 (1876) 2 QDB 29.
5 Hayati A.S. & Hasani, M. A. (2015). A Legal Perspective of Shareholders’ 
Meeting in the Globalised and Interconnected Business Environment. Global 
Conference on Business & Social Science-2014, GCBSS-2014, 15th & 16th 
December, Kuala Lumpur.
6 (2011) 2 NWLR (Pt 1230) 102.
7 Fox, J. (2008). Applied Corporate Governance: Call for Reform of AGM. Keep-
ing Good Companies, 60(5), 270; Nelson, D. (2015). The Dilemma of the 
Shareholders Under the Nigerian Company Law, Journal of Policy and Glo-
balisation.
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conduct of directors is being scrutinised.8 The AGM contributes 
towards the enhancement of good corporate governance by making 
the directors accountable.9 In the AGM shareholders exercise their 
right including the removal of directors based on section 262 of the 
CAMA.
Section 213 of the CAMA states that an AGM shall be held every 
year, apart from other classes of meeting held by the company. 
There must be at least fifteen months between the first AGM and the 
next AGM. In the event a company held its AGM within eighteen 
months of its incorporation, such a company may not hold its next 
AGM in the subsequent year. However, a default in holding an AGM 
within the stipulated period may entitle a shareholder to apply to the 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) to call an AGM. The CAC 
was established by section 7 of the CAMA as a regulatory body to 
monitor the operation of the CAMA among other functions. Where 
there is default in calling an AGM, a shareholder/member may apply 
to the CAC for direction to call the AGM. The CAC may direct a 
shareholder to call and conduct an AGM. Based on section 213(2) 
of the CAMA any decision taken shall bind all other shareholders 
and directors of the company. Similarly, a fine of five hundred Naira 
(N500.00/ less than two pounds), is imposed on every director or 
officer of the company in default. Shareholder participation in an 
AGM is low despite its importance. Part of the reasons for the low 
participation is the delay in receiving notice of meeting10 and lack of 
transparency in the voting process.11 On the one hand, shareholder 
activism through shareholder association is also less effective in 
improving shareholder participation in AGMs. In this regard, a 
brief discussion on shareholder activism and the role of shareholder 
association is given.
8 Proctor, G., & Miles, L. (2003). Corporate Governance. London: Cavendish 
Publishing Limited.
9 Rachagan, S., Pascoe, J. & Joshi, A. (2010). Concise Principles of Company 
Law in Malaysia. 2nd edition.
10 Atte, B. (2015). Enhancing Shareholder’s Participation in Company Meetings 
in Nigeria Through Application of Information Technology. Journal of Hu-
manities and Social Science 20(9); Respondent 3 (Lecturer), interviewed by 
researcher, Nigeria, October 26, 2016.
11 Respondent 2 (Lecturer), interviewed by researcher, Nigeria, October 27, 
2016.
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Shareholder activism originated from the United States and may 
have been successful across the globe.12 It is a process through 
which shareholders assert their power as owners of a company in 
order to influence the manner in which the company is governed.13 
In other words, it is an intervention by shareholders in running the 
affairs of the company which encompasses a wide range of activities, 
including voting, shareholder participation and election of members 
of the board of directors among others.14 Various reasons are given for 
shareholder activism. However, it is prominently linked to principal/
agent relationship.15 It is in this regard that shareholder activism 
mitigates the likelihood of self-dealing by management as well as 
protects the interest of members16 and reconciles agency problems 
between shareholders and the management.17 It is equally regarded 
as a market means of governance that ensures monitoring activities 
of the management toward shareholder value and protection as well 
as defence against managerial deviations.18
In spite of the fact that there are challenges that affect shareholder 
participation in AGMs, there is a dearth of literature regarding 
AGMs in Nigeria as even an Internet search would reveal this fact. 
The objective of this study is to underpin relevant philosophies 
(theories); legal provisions; and opinions of experts (respondents) 
which support shareholder participation in AGMs in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, the role of regulators and shareholder associations in 
12 Robin, H. Q.C. (2013). Hollington on Shareholders’ Rights, 17th edition. United 
Kingdom: Sweet & Maxwell Limited; Magaji, S. (201�). �mproving Member’s 
Participation in the Annual General Meeting under Nigerian Corporate Law. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis. Universiti Utara Malaysia,
13 European Corporate Governance Institute, http://www.ecgi.org/activism/index.
php. (accessed March 25, 2017); Goranova, M., Abouk, R., Nystrom, P. C., 
& Soofi, E. S. (2017). Corporate Governance Antecedents to Shareholder 
Activism: A Zero��nflated Process. Strategic Management Journal, 38(2), 415-
435.
14  Worthington, S. (2001). Shareholders: Property, Power and Entitlement, part 1 
& 2, Vol. 22 Company Lawyer 258.
15 Jensen, Mc. and Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial 
Economics (3) 305. 
16 Beebchuk, L.A. (2005). The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power. Harvard 
Law Review, 118 833.
17 Fama, E.F. and Jensen, M.C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. 
Journal of Law and Economics, (26) 301.
18 Hirschmann, A.O. (1976). Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in 
Firms, Organisations, and States.. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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protecting shareholders as well as improving their participation in 
AGMs would be examined.
 
METHODOLOGY
This study adopted two methods of data collection. The first method 
was doctrinal legal research which was library-based.19 In this regard, 
it mainly concerned statutory provisions of the CAMA; decided 
cases; and authored work. Doctrinal method is problem-solving 
in nature.20 The second method of data collection was qualitative 
interviews which comprised derived data from the opinion of 
respondents.21 The qualitative method enabled the researchers to 
analyse the opinion of respondents and present logical findings.22 
In this study, seventeen respondents were interviewed on theories 
relating to shareholder participation in AGMs as well as the role of 
regulators and shareholder associations on shareholder participation 
in AGMs. The respondents were chosen from among academics and 
shareholder activists based on their practical experience and expertise 
which added value to this study. The interviews were conducted 
face-to-face with the respondents,23 across various states in Nigeria. 
The data was recorded using an audio device and transcribed24 for 
analysis. The data was analysed based on content and themes of the 
study.25 
19  Yaqin, A. (2007). Legal Research and Writing. Lexis Nexis.
20 Dent, C. (2017). A Law Student-Oriented Taxonomy for Research in 
Law. Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev., 48, 371.
21 Seidman, I. (2013). Interviewing as Qualitative Research: A Guide for 
Researchers in Education and the Social Sciences. New York & London. 
Teachers College, Columbia University.
22 Lea, S. (2012). Qualitative Data Analysis. Seminar for the Academic Swiss 
Caucasus Net. Armenia.
23 Sturges, J. E., & Hanrahan, K. J. (2004). Comparing Telephone and Face-To-
Face Qualitative Interviewing: A Research Note. Qualitative Research, 4(1), 
107-118; Dicicco-Bloom, B., & Crabtree, B. F. (2006). The Qualitative Research 
Interview. Medical Education, 40(4), 314-321.
24 Henderson, H. (201�). Difficult Questions of Difficult Questions: The Role of 
the Researcher and Transcription Styles. International Journal of Qualitative 
Studies in Education, 31(2), 143-157.
25  Boyatzis, R. E. (1998). Transforming Qualitative Information: The-
matic Analysis and Code Development. Sage; Green, J., & Thorogood, N. 
(2018). Qualitative Methods for Health Research. Sage.
50
UUMJLS 10(1) Jan 2019  (43-67)
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Various theories including corporate personality theory, agency 
theory, contract theory, shareholder primacy, and corporate 
governance theory implicitly recognise participation of shareholders 
in AGMs. Although, the above theories are not specifically modelled 
on shareholder participation in AGMs they can be linked with 
shareholder participation in AGMs. Moreover, the provision of the 
CAMA, decided cases and opinion of the respondents indicated 
that the above theories support shareholder participation in AGMs. 
The opinion of the respondents in this regard is to demonstrate the 
nexus between the above theories and shareholder participation in 
AGMs. The findings also indicated that regulators and shareholder 
associations are not doing enough towards improving shareholder 
participation in AGMs.
Corporate personality theory
Starting with the corporate personality theory, the term �corporation’ 
derived its meaning from the Latin word �corporatus’ which means a 
body or group of persons that come together for a mutual purpose.26 
However, whether this body or group had separate rights distinct 
from individual members was the subject of discussion by German 
and French philosophers in the nineteenth century.27 This necessitated 
various theories of corporate personality which included the 
creature theory; fiction theory; and concession theory. The creature 
theory propounded by Savigny believed in the individual nature of 
a person, which conferred certain inalienable rights duly recognised 
by the law.28 Savigny argued that there was a legal relationship 
between one person and another. Therefore, individuals were free to 
form an association without an independent existence on its own.29 
However, the law recognised the status of this body as an �artificial 
26 Schane, S.A. (1987). The Corporation is a Person: The Language of Legal 
Fiction, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 563. 
27 Katsuhito, I. (1999). Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate 
Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, American 
Journal of Comparative Law 47(4), 583-632.
28 George, H. Ed. (1977). Associations and Law: The Classical and Early Christian 
Stages.  Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
29 Iwai, K. (1999). Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality 
Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance. The American Journal of 
Comparative Law, 47(4), 583-632.
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or juristic person.’ The fiction theory, on the one hand, recognised 
the corporation as a legal fiction.30 This theory viewed corporations 
as natural persons even though there are obvious differences 
between a natural person and a corporation.31 However, there must 
be natural persons (in the form of directors) to run the affairs of 
the company.32 The concession theory, on the one hand, argued that 
corporate personality is a result of state law.33 It cannot be conferred 
by anybody apart from the law of a state. In this regard, section 37 of 
the CAMA recognised that a company after incorporation acquired 
the status of a corporate body with all powers including the power to 
hold land, perpetual succession and a common seal among others.
The above provision recognised a company as a legal person that is 
distinct and separate from the shareholders.34 The above principle 
was codified under the CAMA based on the famous case of Salomon 
v. Salomon.35 In the same vein, various decisions of Nigerian courts 
pronounced on the corporate personality principle.36 This theory is 
the foundation of the present corporate law regarding shareholders 
and the company as two separate entities.37 In view of this there 
is the need for shareholders and the management to meet for the 
directors to account for their stewardship.38 This is only possible 
through the participation of shareholders in the AGM.39 According 
to Respondent 1,40 “From the day a company is incorporated, certain 
30 Radin, M. (1932). The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality. Columbia 
Law Review, 32(4), 643-667.
31 Maximilian, K. (1949). Person in Imagination or Persona Ficta of The 
Corporation,” 9 La. L. Rev. 437; Wells, H. (Ed.). (2018). Research Handbook 
on the History of Corporate and Company Law. Edward Elgar Publishing.
32 Ghadas, Z. A. A. (2007). Real or Artificial�Jurisprudential Theories on Corporate 
Personality. US-China Law Review, 4, 6.
33 Robert, H. (1979). New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private 
Property Model. 30, Hastings L. J. 1327.
34 Ndzi, E. (2017). The impact of the Salomon Principle on Directors’ Remuneration 
in the UK. International Journal of Law and Management, 59(2), 257-270.
35 (1879) AC 22.
36 M. A. Omisade & Ors v Harry Akande (1987) LPELR 2639 S.C.; Tsokwa Oil 
Marketing Co. v. U.T.C. (Nig.) Plc (2002) 12 NWLR (Pt 52) 437 C.A.
37  Iwai, K op cit.
38 Kaler, J. (2002). Responsibility, Accountability and Governance. Business 
Ethics: A European Review, 11(4), 327-334.
39 Cordery, C. J. (2005). Annual General Meeting as An Accountability Mechanism. 
Working Paper No.23, University of Wellington, New Zealand.
40 Respondent 1 (Lecturer), interviewed by researcher, Nigeria, November 6, 
2016.
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organs are immediately put in place. One of such organs is the board 
of directors and the shareholders in the general meeting. The directors 
and shareholders must meet in the annual general meeting.” From 
the provision of section 37 of the CAMA, decided cases and the 
opinion of Respondent 1 prior this, it may be argued that corporate 
personality principle is recognised under Nigerian corporate law. 
Similarly, there is recognition by shareholders to participate in 
AGMs as the only forum for shareholders to meet directors.
Agency theory
This theory views a corporation as a relationship between individuals 
with a common interest.41 Jensen and Meckling argued that agency 
theory regulates the relationship between a principal and the agent. 
In a corporation, shareholders are deemed to be the principal while 
the board of directors is regarded as the agent.42 Shareholders 
invest their resources and empower the board of directors to act on 
their behalf. This is because, in many instances, it is difficult for 
shareholders to possess both the capital and the expertise to manage 
a company.43 However, the problem(s) arises in the relationship 
between shareholders and the board. Arnold and de Lange pointed 
out that risk tolerance is viewed differently by shareholders and 
the board.44 While shareholders are concerned with high returns on 
investment, the board is more interested in what they will gain.45 
At certain times, shareholders are not sure about the performance 
of the board regarded as �agent’.46 Moreover, there is a conflict of 
interest regarding decision-making. Shareholders always want lasting 
41 Jensen, M.C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of The Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial 
Economics 3, 305-360; Rashidah A., & Mohammad R.Salim. (2010). Corporate 
Governance in Malaysia: Theory, Law and Context. Malaysia: Sweet & 
Maxwell.
42 Conyon, M. J., & Leech, D. (1994). Top Pay, Company Performance and 
Corporate Governance. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 56(3), 
229-247.
43 Claire E. C., And Robert S. H. (1989). A Test of The Agency Theory of 
Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and Corporate Dividends. 
Financial Management, 18(4), 36-46; Magaji, fn. 12.
44 Arnold, B., & De Lange, P. (2004). Enron: An Examination of Agency Problems. 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 15(6), 751-765.
45 Simon, H.A. (1951). A Formal Theory of The Employment Contract. 
Econometrica, 19, 293- 305.
46  Rashidah & Mohamed, fn. 41.
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solutions while the board may proffer short-term solutions so that 
their performance would be appreciated.47 This theory emphasised 
the use of proper control mechanisms between the shareholders and 
the board that ensures reduction in cost of monitoring the activities 
of the board.48 This is possible through the exercise of voting rights 
in the general meeting.49 There is the need for effective monitoring 
by shareholders.50 In this regard, sections 63 and 64 of the CAMA 
specifically distribute corporate powers between shareholders at 
the AGM and the board of directors. Respondent 3,51 “A company 
is a legal person. It can only operate through biological human 
beings (directors). Shareholders of the company must participate in 
decision-making and give directions that the company will follow.” 
This necessitates for shareholders to checkmate the activities of the 
board which is only possible through AGMs.
Contract theory
This theory originated from the United States of America.52 
The contract theory is one of the essential theories in corporate 
governance today.53 This theory also emphasised on ‘maximising 
self�interest’ as the best monitoring mechanism.54 A company is 
viewed as a relationship consisting of different contracts entered 
by various stakeholders.55 Shareholders invest their capital to get 
a return and therefore, are entitled to all the excess profit left after 
settlement with other stakeholders.56 Shareholders here are given 
47 Steven V. M. And Neil W. S. (1991). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow: 
Acquisition Activity and Equity Issues. Journal of Business, 64(2), 213-227. 
48  Rashidah & Mohamed, fn. 41.
49 Baums, T. (2000). General Meetings in Listed Companies – New Challenges 
and Opportunities, Company Law Reform in OECD Countries: A Comparative 
Outlook of Current Trends. Stockholm, Sweden.
50 Susan P. S. (2005). Agency Theory. Annual Review of Sociology, 31, 263-284. 
51 Respondent 3 (Lecturer), interviewed by researcher, Nigeria, October 26, 
2016.
52 Oliver, H. (1995). Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications. 
Economic Journal, 105(430), 678-689.
53  Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. The 
Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737-783.
54  Easterbrook, F. & Fischel, D. (1993). Contract and Fiduciary Duty. Journal of 
Law and Economics, 36, 425.
55 Fama, E. (1980). Agency Problems and The Theory of The Firm. Journal of 
Political Economy, 88, 288 At 290.
56  Johnson, A. (2007). After OFR: Can UK Shareholder Value Still Be Enlightened? 
European Business Organisation Law Review 7, 817 At 821.
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ultimate control on how the company is to be managed because 
they bear a high percentage of risk.57 Accordingly, the AGM is the 
only forum for the shareholders to monitor the board.58 The AGM 
is conducted in fulfilment of the contractual agreement between 
shareholders and the board.59 
In this regard, section 41 of the CAMA provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Act, the memorandum 
and articles, when registered, shall have the effect of 
a contract under seal between the company and its 
members and officers and between the members and 
officers themselves whereby they agree to observe and 
perform the provisions of the memorandum and articles, 
as altered from time to time in so far as they relate to the 
company, members, or officers as such.
The above provision makes it clear that a company’s memorandum 
and articles of association has the effect of a valid contract between 
the company; shareholders; and the board. Thus, shareholders have 
the freedom to adopt any rule they agree to govern their relationship 
provided it is not against the law.60 This is contained in the articles 
of association and sometimes complemented by shareholders’ 
agreement.61 The articles of association is a contractual obligation 
between the shareholders and the company.62 In the case of Longe 
v. FBN PLC, the Court of Appeal of Nigeria held that the powers 
vested on the board of directors was a contractual power that can 
only be taken by amendment. The memorandum and articles of 
association constituted a binding contract not only between the 
57 Van Der Weide, M. (1996). Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders. 
Journal of Corporate Law 21, 27 At 57.
58 Apostolides, N., & Boden, R. (2005). Cedric the Pig: Annual General Meetings 
and Corporate Governance in the UK. Social Responsibility Journal 1(1), 53-
62.
59 Chong, B. C., Ngee, P. K.T. & Ling, P. SW. (2006). Chan & Koh On Malaysian 
Company Law:  Principles & Practice. 2nd Edition.
60 Robin, H. Q.C. (2013). Hollington on Shareholder’s Rights, 17th Edition. 
England: Sweet & Maxwell.
61 Lucian, A. B. (2005). The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power. Harvard Law 
Review, 118(3), 833-914.
62 Kahn-Freund, O. (1940). Articles of Association and Contractual Rights. The 
Modern Law Review, 4(2), 145-148.
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company and its shareholders but equally between individual 
shareholders themselves.63 Both the calling of an AGM and its 
conduct is regulated by the law as well as the article under section 33 
and 213 of the CAMA. In this regard, Respondent 4 stated that:64
One of the organs through which decisions would 
be taken is the annual general meeting. That is why 
section 213 of the CAMA states that there must be an 
AGM once in a year. The management of a company 
has certain responsibilities, but certain powers are 
exclusively given to the general meeting, like a change 
of name, increase of capital, and reduction of capital. 
That is why you need shareholders at the general 
meeting.
Shareholder primacy
Shareholder primacy is another concept developed based on 
partnership principles. This concept contends that management of 
the business is totally within the control of the shareholders. The 
Companies Act of the United Kingdom which was the model for 
the CAMA stressed that shareholders are regarded as the most 
important organ of a company.65 The need for the enhancement of 
shareholder primacy is crucial regardless of any other object of a 
company.66 The Common law emphasised shareholder primacy on 
director’s duty of loyalty to the company.67 This concept does not 
attach much significance to the interest of other stakeholders.68 In 
the English case of Hutton v. West Cork Railway Co, Bowen LJ 
held that considering the interest of other stakeholders in a company 
63  Yalaju Amaye v A. R.E.C (1990) 4 NWLR Pt. 145 422; NIB Investment West-
Africa v. Omisore (2006)4 NWLR Pt. 969 172 at 200; Agbonika, J., Alewo, M., 
and Olong,M.A (2014). the legal effects of articles of association of a company: 
Perspectives on corporate governance in Nigeria. Journal of Law, Policy and 
Globalization 28, 124-128.
64 Respondent 4 (Lecturer), interviewed by researcher, Nigeria, November 24, 
2016.
65 Shuangge W. (2013). Shareholder Primacy and Corporate Governance: Legal 
Aspects, Practices and Future Direction. New York: Routledge Taylor & 
Francis Group; Magaji. fn. 12.
66 Hampel Report on Corporate Governance: Finance Report (1998). 
67 Davies, P., Worthington, S., & Micheler, E. (2008). Gower And Davies: 
Principles of Modern Company Law 8th Edition. London: Sweet & Maxwell.
68 Shuangge, op cit.
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is a qualified one. Directors are only obliged to consider the interest 
of other stakeholders where it would benefit the shareholders. This 
theory is relevant to the study for its recognition of shareholders as 
the most vital organ of a company.69 Respondent 3 stated:70
 
Shareholders are the primary stakeholders in every 
company. All their powers and rights are derived 
largely based on their investment in a company 
because they are the residual owners of a company. 
Having invested in the company it is only reasonable 
to expect that they should have a say on the running 
of the company and that is why the law expressly 
recognises some number of rights or powers vested 
in them.
Concept of corporate governance
 
There is no specific definition on the concept of corporate governance. 
According to the Cadbury Report on Financial Aspect of Corporate 
Governance 1992, corporate governance is a system whereby 
companies are �directed and controlled.’ The Hampel Committee 
adopted this definition on Corporate Governance, 199�. According 
to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), corporate governance means:
 
The system by which business corporations are directed and 
controlled. The governance structure specifies the distribution 
of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the 
corporation such as the board, managers, shareholders and other 
stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures for making 
decisions on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides 
the structure through which objectives are set, and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance.71 
69  Kucukyalcin, E. (2018). Converging the Shareholder and Stakeholder Theories. 
In Sustainability and Social Responsibility: Regulation and Reporting 203-223. 
Springer, Singapore.
70 Respondent 3 (Lecturer), interviewed by researcher, Nigeria, October 27, 
2016.
71 Richard, S. (2010). Practical Guide to Corporate Governance 4th Edition. 
United Kingdom: Sweet & Maxwell.
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The above definition recognised distribution of rights between 
the board and shareholders as well as monitoring the activities of 
the board by shareholders. Accordingly, corporate decisions must 
reflect certain values including accountability and transparency.72 
This helps in making sound corporate decisions. Two main theories 
of corporate governance reflected in most of the previous studies 
are shareholder value theory and stakeholder theory. Shareholder 
value theory emphasised the interest of shareholders above any 
other stakeholder in a company73 just like the concept of shareholder 
primacy. This theory recognised shareholder interest as paramount 
beyond any other interest in the company. According to Respondent 
2,74 “Shareholder participation at the annual general meeting is 
recognition that they have interest that is above the interest of other 
stakeholders. Shareholders must participate in the AGM. It is an 
indispensable right that must be respected.” This equally recognised 
shareholder participation at the AGM as very crucial.75
Regulatory institutions
The two regulatory institutions in Nigeria are the Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). The CAC was established by section 7 of the CAMA as a 
regulatory body to monitor the enforcement of the provision of the 
CAMA. The SEC on the one hand was established by the Investment 
and Securities Act 2007 as a corporate regulator as well as the 
apex regulator concerning capital market. Accordingly, corporate 
regulators have a significant impact in ensuring compliance with 
relevant laws and rules by the board of directors. Today, regulators 
institute cases against the board of directors for breach of their 
duties.76 However, regulators in Nigeria, arguably, are not doing 
72 Luo, Y. (2005). Corporate Governance and Accountability in Multinational 
Enterprises: Concepts and Agenda. Journal of International Management, 11(1), 
1-18; Du Plessis, J. J., Hargovan, A., & Harris, J. (2018). Principles of 
contemporary corporate governance. Cambridge University Press.
73 Lazonick, W., & O’Sullivan, M. (2000). Maximizing Shareholder Value: A 
New Ideology for Corporate Governance. Economy and Society, 29(1), 13-35.
74 Respondent 2 (Lecturer), interviewed by researcher, Nigeria, October 27, 
2016.
75 Owusu, A., & Weir, C. (2018). Agency Costs, Ownership Structure and 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Ghana. International Journal of 
Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation, 14(1), 63-84.
76 Ramsay, I. (2015). Increased Corporate Governance Powers of Shareholders and 
Regulators and the Role of the Corporate Regulator in Enforcing Duties Owed 
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enough to see that shareholders participate at AGMs. In this regard, 
the Director General of the CAC believed that the current provision of 
the CAMA which is a legislation of more than 20 years, prevents the 
CAC from fully exercising its regulatory and enforcement functions. 
He calls for a substantial amendment of the CAMA.77 From the 
perspective of the respondents, Respondent 2 argued: “We have weak 
regulatory infrastructure in Nigeria. The surveillance, monitoring, and 
enforcement are very low.”78 Another Respondent79 added that, “The 
regulatory bodies are not doing enough. They are only concerned 
with how to raise money. They are expected to regulate, but now they 
are acting as government revenue collectors.” The majority of the 
respondents argued that regulators are not doing enough to see that 
shareholders are enlightened to participate in AGMs.
Shareholder associations in Nigeria
The question now is, to what extent do shareholder associations 
protect the interest of its members? This is made possible through 
various changes to the code of corporate governance and the forming 
of shareholder associations. Accordingly, Rule 26 of the Code 
of Corporate Governance for Public Companies in Nigeria 2011 
(CCGPCN) tasks the management to ensure fair and transparent 
dealings with shareholder associations. This rule, not only recognised 
the forming of shareholder associations, but, rather transparency in 
their dealings. Although, recently, the Financial Reporting Council has 
issued a draft of the Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance (NCCG 
2018) which has suspended the earlier code. The fact is that the codes 
recognised shareholder associations.
The Nigerian government established various shareholder associations. 
In 1992, zonal headquarters was established alongside seven (7) zonal 
offices. They were located in seven different states of the federation, 
 
by Corporate Directors and Managers.” European Business Law Review 26(1), 
49-73.
77 “20 Years after Enactment, CAC RG Calls for Amendment of CAMA.” http://
new.cac.gov.ng/home/20-years-after-enactment-cac-rg-calls-for-amendment-
of-cama/ (accessed November 17, 2017).
78 Respondent 2 (Lecturer), interviewed by researcher, Nigeria, October 27, 
2016.
79 Respondent 8 (Shareholder activist), interviewed by researcher, Nigeria, 
December 12, 2016.
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namely: Rivers, Kaduna, Jos, Kano, Lagos, Anambra and Oyo. 
These associations were all incorporated with the CAC. The SEC 
also regulates the activities of shareholder associations through its 
code for shareholders associations.80 This gives an opportunity for 
shareholders to be represented by their association on the board.81 
The executive council of these associations is responsible for 
educating shareholders and keeping a record of them within their 
respective zones.82 Shareholder associations protect the interest 
of investing shareholders who have the opportunity to contribute 
to the formulation of broad corporate policies thereby enhancing 
management accountability and transparency.83 Some of the duties 
of these associations include educating shareholders on their rights 
and responsibilities and right of participation in corporate decision-
making through regular attendance of company meetings.84 
There are also various independent associations of shareholders 
in Nigeria which aim to protect shareholders.85 Accordingly, 
shareholders have challenged decisions of management which had 
not acted in the best interest of the company.86 Unfortunately, some 
executives of these associations prioritised their selfish interest 
against that of the shareholders. In fact, they failed in educating 
shareholders on their rights and how to exercise them.87 Moreover, 
there is no provision under the CAMA that recognised shareholder 
associations. In spite of this, there is a Companies and Allied Matters 
Bill 2018 which is awaiting assent.
80 Ruth, P. (2011). Shareholders Associations and Rest of Us. http://www.
vanguardngr.com/2011/09/  (accessed April 25, 2017).
81 Newman, C. E., & Chibuike, O. O. (2014).  Corporate Governance Reforms in 
Nigeria: A Study of Shareholders’ Right of Entry. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2397377  (accessed April 25, 2016).
82 Amao & Amaeshi.
83  Etukudo. A (2000). Issues in Privatization and Restructuring in Sub-Saharan 
Africa - Interdepartmental Action Programme on Privatization, Restructuring 
and Economic Democracy Working Paper IPPRED 5. http://www.ilo.org/public/
english/employment/ent/papers/ippred5.htm (accessed March 29, 2017).
84 Ibid.
85  Sola, E. O. (2016). Role of Shareholders in Implementing the Code of Corporate 
Governance. http://www.businessdayonline.com  (accessed February 27, 
2016).
86 Okike, E. N. M. (2007). Corporate Governance in Nigeria: the status quo’ 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(2) 173-193.
87 Rotimi, B. (2015). A Minority Shareholder. http://www.daargroup.com/
daar-group/latest-news/vanguardngr-shareholders-associations-losing-focus. 
(accessed March 17, 2015).
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Opinion of respondents from qualitative interviews on the role 
of shareholder associations in improving shareholder rights of 
participation in AGMs
In this regard, thirteen respondents out of seventeen were interviewed 
on the role of shareholder associations towards improving and 
protecting the rights of shareholders. Ten respondents out of thirteen 
argued that shareholder associations were not doing enough to 
protect shareholders. From some of the excerpts, Respondent 
5 was of the view that, “Shareholder associations have been in 
existence and they have always been conniving with management to 
perpetuate whatever the management wants.”88 Respondent 7 added, 
“Shareholder associations are not doing their jobs. I do not think they 
are representing the shareholders.”89 In his response, Respondent 12, 
added, “The main problem is, there is no control in the shareholder 
association. Before the AGM, we receive calls to the extent we do 
not want the AGM to come up because everybody is a registered 
shareholder association. It is more of protecting the personal interests 
of leaders of the associations than the shareholders.”90 
However, Respondent 17 believed, “There should be enlightenment 
which is essential. Then, shareholder association should have a role 
to play because it is a collective decision; it is easier to get justice 
going to court through the shareholder association than going to 
court as an individual.”91 This explains the need to have shareholder 
associations to represent the interest of other members in educating 
them to attend AGMs and to enlighten them about their rights and 
how to enforce these rights. Respondent 17 further stated, “At times, 
the AGMs are teleguided because most of the shareholders are 
participating through shareholder associations and companies fund 
most of these associations. Therefore, the associations are indirectly 
controlled by the management.”92 According to Respondent 16, 
88 Respondent 5 (Lecturer), interviewed by researcher, Kano, Nigeria, October 25, 
2016.
89 Respondent 7 (Shareholder activist), interviewed by researcher, FCT Abuja, 
Nigeria, October 27, 2016.
90 Respondent 12 (Company Director), interviewed by researcher, Kano, Nigeria, 
November 22, 2016.
91 Respondent 17 (Regulator), interviewed by researcher, FCT Abuja, Nigeria, 
November 22, 2016.
92 Respondent 17 (Regulator), interviewed by researcher, FCT Abuja, Nigeria, 
November 22, 2016.
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“Nigeria is a wonderful country and that is why people are rushing 
to get this kind of engagements (shareholders association) for their 
personal interests.”93 
On the other hand, three of the respondents argued that shareholder 
associations in Nigeria are protecting the interests of the shareholders. 
Respondent 16 claimed:94 “To some extent, shareholder associations 
are doing their best to protect the interests of shareholders.”
The opinion of the respondents indicated that shareholder associations 
that were formed to protect the interest of shareholders have been 
compromised. This puts shareholders in a challenging situation 
because both the regulators and the associations they (shareholders) 
formed are not meeting up to expectations in educating the 
shareholders on the importance of participating in AGMs. Similarly, 
the regulators and shareholder associations have failed in their duty 
to inform shareholders of their rights and the enforcement process.
CONCLUSION
Shareholder participation at AGMs is a personal and indispensable 
right that belongs to shareholders based on sections 81 and 213 of 
the CAMA. Accordingly, shareholders rely on AGMs as a forum 
to exercise their rights, and any violation of this right will entitle a 
shareholder(s) to seek redress. Shareholder participation in decision-
making is the key to any reform that seeks shareholder remedies.95 The 
discussion in this study has indicated that shareholder participation 
at AGMs has been recognised from the legal and philosophical 
perspective as well as from the opinions of respondents. However, 
one may be interested to know whether in practice shareholders do 
participate in AGMs in Nigeria. Admittedly, various challenges affect 
shareholder participation in AGMs including delays in receiving 
93 Respondent 16 (Regulator), interviewed by researcher, Kano, Nigeria, 
November 21, 2016.
94 Respondent 16 (Regulator), interviewed by researcher, Kano, Nigeria, 
November 21, 2016.
95 Rachagan, S. & Mohd Sulaiman, A. (201�). Expanding Shareholders’ 
Power: An Analysis of Reform Proposals in Malaysia.  Review of Law 
& Economics. Retrieved 11 Mar. 2018, from doi:10.1515/rle-2015-
0041
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notices since there is no provision under the CAMA that recognise the 
application of ICT in serving notices of meetings. Despite this, there 
have been attempts to remedy some of these challenges through the 
Companies and Allied Matters Bill 2018 which is awaiting assent. 
Furthermore, both regulators and shareholder associations must 
exercise their responsibility not only in imposing fines but rather on 
educating shareholders on the importance of participating in AGMs 
as well as raising shareholders awareness regarding their rights and 
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